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IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
THROUGH EGG DONATION:
A PROSPECTIVE VIEW OF
LEGAL ISSUES
JAMES

1.

M.

TREPPA*

INTRODUCTION

It is estimated that 10-20% of the couples desiring to have
children are unable to do so because of infertility. 1 For these
couples, the opportunity to bear children is now available
through the use of numerous noncoita12 reproductive techniques. These "new" techniques, designed as an alternative to
infertility, include in vitro fertilization (IVF),S artificial insemination: and surrogacy.6 Although adoption is still a viable
alternative, it has become less available due to a decrease in
"adoptable" babies relative to demand. s In addition, many
couples desire to produce a child that is genetically related to
at least one parent, and many women desire to go through the
experience of bearing and raising a child whether or not that
child is genetically related to them.

As reproductive techniques continue to advance, many
legal and ethical questions surrounding the use of some of
these techniques remain unanswered. One such technique is
IVF through the use of egg/oocyte 7 donation. The lack oflegal
or statutory parameters regarding the use of IVF egg donation
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
1. Giesen, International Medical Malpractice Law, 628 (1988).
2. "Coitus" means sexual intercourse; a sexual union between male and female.
STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 151 (1987).
3. "In vitro" is defined as an artificial environment ... as in a test tube or culture
media. Id. at 384.
4. "Artificial insemination" is the introduction of semen of the husband or of
another into the vagina other than through the act of coitus. Id. at 379.
5. A "surrogate" is a person who functions in another's life as a substitute for some
third person. ld. at 719.
6. American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee: Ethical Considerations of the
New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fert. and Steril. 37s (Supp. I, 1986).
7. Trouson & Wood, Extra Corporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, Clinics
in Obstetrics and Gynecology, Dec. 1981 at 1. An oocyte is an egg, or ovum, that is
removed directly from the ovary. It is mature oocytes that are transfered from ovarian follicles and matured in vitro.
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is a direct consequence of judicial and legislative failure to promulgate guidelines regarding noncoital reproduction. As
many judges continue to point to legislators for guidance,
proposed bills stagnate at the hearing stage. 8
This article focuses on a specific hypothetical that has yet
to be litigated in California or in any other state or federal court
in the United States. Imagine a situation in which a married
couple9 wishes to bear a child but discovers that the woman is
infertile. The woman expresses a desire to gestate 10 the offspring herself, so the couple decides to undergo IVF by use of
egg donation. At this point they have two alternatives. First,
the couple could go to a clinic that provides donated eggs, and
pay for the use of these eggs in the fertilization process.
Alternatively the couple could find a woman with whom they
have some relationship, and contract with her to donate eggs
in the fertilization process. Many couples are using the eggs
of sisters, cousins, or close friends because they are more
aware of the biological attributes and medical history of the
donating woman.
In the first scenario, a subsequent custody battle over the
child is not likely for the same reasons a subsequent lawsuit
involving a "stranger" donating sperm is not likely to occur.
When an anonymous donor is involved, there are a large number of potential biological offspring that may be involved. In
this situation the donor may not feel compelled to sue for custody of any of the resulting children, even if she later discovers that she has become infertile. In the second alternative it
is easy to see why a subsequent lawsuit for custody of the
child may result. Assume the donee couple has undergone successful IVF with donated eggs of the relative or friend. The
donor then decides she wants to have her own child, but
8. In California, the legislators adopted part of the Unifonn Parentage Act in Civil
Code Sections 7000-7021 in 1975, but no new legislation in regards to techniques such
as egg donation has been enacted since that time.
9. Although this article will focus on the legal rights of married couples desiring
to use egg donation, it is my view that these rights should be shared by unmarried and
same·sex couples as well. The reason for this limited focus is simply that historical·
Iy, courts have not been willing to take such a big step in granting equal rights. If these
rights can be granted to a married couple initially, the same rights should logically
follow to other groups of infertile women through constitutional protections. For a dis·
cussion of whether IVF should be restricted to married couples see Annas & Elias, NF
and Embryo Transfer: Mediolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17
Fam. L. Q. 211 (1983).
10. "Gestation" refers to pregnancy in viviparous animals. STEDMAN'S POCK·
ET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 307.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/7

2

Treppa: In Vitro Fertilization

1992]

IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

779

dfscovers she has become infertile. Here, the donor is much
more likely to sue for her biological offspring. How should a
California court decide?
In either situation, and without legislative guidance expressly directed at egg donation, the court must make a number of difficult decisions on a number of issues. First, since one woman
is the donor/genetic mother and the other is the recipient/gestational mother, the court must decide who is the "natural"
mother of the child. Second, the court must decide whether or
not the donor/genetic mother may terminate her parental rights
in the offspring through contractual agreement. Lastly, the
court must decide whether or not custody should be granted to
the donor/genetic mother, or to the recipient couple that includes
the gestational mother and genetic father.
This article attempts to predict the outcome of these decisions as they specifically relate to IVF by use of egg donation.
My initial prospective conclusion, based on case law already litigated in the areas of surrogate mothering, 11 artificial ins emination,12 gestational surrogacy,IS and the best interests of the
child, is that a California court would find the recipient/gestational mother to be the "natural" mother. In addition, the
court would uphold the contract if the donor/genetic mother
gave her informed consent to terminate any parental rights she
might have to the child. Finally, the court would grant custody
to the recipient couple, taking into account not only the biological and gestational tie the child has with the couple, but also
the IVF contract and most importantly the best interests of the
child.
This article will take you through the analytical process I
followed in reaching my conclusion. First, for those unfamiliar with in vitro fertilization, it is important to understand the
medical procedure and the role each individual has in the
birth of the IVF child. This explanation is followed by a discussion of four areas of law that the court will most likely
consider when analyzing the legal issues surrounding IVF
egg donation: surrogacy, artificial insemination, gestational
surrogacy, and the "best interests of the offspring." Finally, this
11. Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Adoption of Matthew B., 232
Cal. App. 3d 1239 (1991).
12. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986).
13. Anna J. v. Mark C., 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12433 (1991). It should be
noted that this case is currently under review by the California Supreme Court.
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author argues that until the court decides otherwise, all rearing and custodial rights should be placed with the recipient couple. Moreover, new legislation, rather than judicial directives,
should be the first step in avoiding ugly court battles in the
future.
II.

MEDICAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE OF IVF

A.

Female Infertility14

Infertility in women may be caused by lack of ovarian
function due to gonadal dysgenesis,I5 an insensitive ovary, or
autoimmunity.16 Ovarian function may also be absent due to
premature menopause,!7 surgically absent ovaries, chemotherapy or other radiotherapy-induced ovarian failure. IS Women
with normal ovarian function may be infertile because of
blocked fallopian tubes or abnormal oocytes. 19 IVF, described
in more detail below, gives these women the chance to become
pregnant and carry a child to term, whereas without the use
of this technique it would be physically and biologically impossible for them to do so.
B.

IVF Procedure

Egg donation can be used by couples to achieve parenthood
when the woman is infertile. IVF through egg donation generally involves two initial steps: 1) the donor's ovaries are
hyperstimulated by fertility hormone drugs to produce several mature eggs for ovulation;20 and 2) egg retrieval is performed
14. "Infertility" is defined as, "relative sterility; diminished or absent fertility;
in the female it indicates adequate anatomical structures and equivocal function, with
the possibility of pregnancy that mayor may not proceed to term." STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 375.
15. "Gonadal dysgenesis" refers to defective development of the gonads (reproductive glands that include the ovaries and testes). Id. at 226 ..
16. In immunology, "autoimmunity" is a condition in which one's own tissues are subject to deleterious (harmful) effects of the immunological system. Id.
at 78.
17. "Menopause" is the permanent cessation of the menses or menstral flow. Id.
at 446.
18. Rosenwaks, Donor Eggs: Their Application in Modern Reproductive
Technology, 47 Fert. and Steril. 895, 897-98 (1987).
19. Id.
20. "Ovulation" is the release of an ovum from the ovarian follicle. STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 542.
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surgically either by laparoscopy21 or through transvaginal
ultrasonographic22 methods. 23
An average of ten eggs24 are then placed in a petri dish with
the male's sperm to effect fertilization. If fertilization occurs,
the resulting conceptus 25 is transferred to another dish. 28 Mter
the eggs have divided twice (the "four-cell stage"), the physician transfers approximately five blastocysts through the
cervix to the uterus of the recipient/gestational mother. If the
transfer is successful, the blastocyst will attach to the uterine
wall as if natural conception had occurred. 27
C..

Cryopreservation

In vitro fertilized eggs that are not transferred to the uterine cavity may be frozen by use of a procedure called "cryopreservation. "28 There are many medical advantages in preserving and later using the extra-embryos: an 8-12% increase
in IVF pregnancies; physical, psychological and financial cost
reduction of IVF treatment; and an embryo selection increase
by recipient couples for transfer on genetic grounds. 29 Although
21. This is one form of peritoneoscopy that examines the contents of the peritoneum (the smooth transparent serous membrane that lines the cavity of the
abdomen) with a peritoneoscope passed through the abdominal wall. 1d. at 782.
22. An "ultasonography" locates, measures or delinates deep structures by measuring the reflection or transmission of high frequency or ultrasonic waves. Id. at 782.
23. The growing trend is to retrieve the eggs through transvaginal ultrasound,
where the physician can guide a catheter through a small scope to gather the eggs.
Sauer, Paulson, and Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation Extending
Reproductive Potential To Women Over 40.323:17 New Eng. J. Med. 1157 (1991); hereinafter Sauer. Paulson, and Lobo. A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation. This is
a popular method because it does not require the use of anesthesia and therefore may
encourage more women to become donors. Garcia. Reproductive Technology For
Procreation, Experimentation, and Profit, 11 J. Leg. Med. 1, 14 (1990).
24. Sauer, Paulson, and Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation, supra
note 23. at 1158.
25. The term "conceptus" is used to refer to the product of conception; here it refers
to the product of any union of human sperm and human ova, occuring in vitro. STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 157.
26. At this point, the fertilized eggs undergo a number of cell divisions forming
a blastodermic vessicle, called the blastocyst. consisting of the inner cell mass and a
thin trophoblast layer. Id. at 92.
27. Throughout the first trimester, the recipient female will undergo estrogen and
progesterone replacement in order to maintain the pregnancy. Sauer. Paulson, and
Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation, supra note 23 at 1157-58.
28. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of NF Technology,
28 Jurimetrics J. 285,287 (Spring 1988); hereinafter Robertson, Decisional Authority
Over Embryos. The eggs are frozen so that they may be used in further egg and embryo
donation and gestational surrogacy.
29.1d.
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these interests are arguably compelling to the medical profession, cryopreservation raises many legal issues.
The first issue raised by cryopreservation involves the right
to terminate the frozen, pre-implantation embryos. Because the
United States Supreme Court believes that fetuses are not
"persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment30
and therefore not entitled to Due Process or Equal Protection
guarantees, it is hard to imagine how a fertilized embryo would
be allowed these constitutional guarantees. However, some protection may be afforded to a frozen embryo because the
donor/genetic mother, who is not carrying the embryo, may
not be able to raise the claim of "health of the mother. "31
A second issue involves custody of the frozen fertilized
eggs during separation or divorce of the recipient couple. Who
should have the rights to, and the rearing duties of the IVF offspring?32 These issues, while better addressed in an article solely dedicated to their analysis,33 deserve to be stated here
because of their potential importance in the framing of legal
rights surrounding egg donation.
With a basic understanding of IVF medical procedure, let
us consider the hypothetical couple who goes through IVF egg
donation and is subsequently sued by the egg donor. Because
the outcome of this litigation depends entirely on analogy, a
California court would most likely consider the reasoning of
previously litigated "reproductive" cases in order to render
its decision. I will next analyze four areas of "reproductive"
cases in an attempt to provide a prospective view of the court's
final determination.
III.

SURROGATE MOTHERING CASES

Surrogate mothering raises questions beyond those related to IVF egg donation, because only two people are involved
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
31. The Court states in Roe that it is, areasonable and appropriate for a State to
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that
of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no
longer sole and any right she possesses must be measured accordingly." Id.
32. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641. The court in Davis held that seven cryogenically frozen
embryos produced by in vitro fertilization of woman's ova with her estranged husband's
sperm are human life whose best interests require that they be made available,
despite the husband's objection, for implantation in the woman to give them the
opportunity to be born
'
33. See Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos, supra note 28.
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in the "reproduction" of the child. In a "pure surrogacy" situation, a woman contracts with a couple to carry a child to
term for them. The surrogate is artificially inseminated with
the male's sperm and becomes pregnant. She then carries
the offspring through gestation and birth, whereby she gives
the child over to the recipient couple per the terms of the contract. The only two individuals directly involved in the creation
and birth of the child are the surrogate and the man whose
semen is used to impregnate the surrogate.
Remember, in IVF egg donation, the donor/genetic mother
provides the egg that is fertilized with the male's sperm. Then
a third person, the recipient/gestational mother, is implanted
with the fertilized embryo. In IVF egg donation, three individuals are directly involved in the creation and birth of the
child. This distinction may be important when considering the
persuasiveness of "pure surrogacy" cases when applied to the
IVF custody battle.
A.

Matter of Baby M.

The leading case regarding "pure surrogacy" is the landmark
decision Matter of Baby M.34 In 1985, William Stern and Mary
Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby
Mrs. Whitehead would provide gestational services to the Sterns
in exchange for $10,000. 36 After giving birth, Mrs. Whitehead
realized that she could not part with the child. She felt a bond
with the child that developed during her pregnancy.38 A custody
battle ensued, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the
matter. In a unanimous decision, the court concluded that the
surrogacy contract was invalid, because it conflicted with both
existing statutes and public policies of the State. 37 The court stated that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental
rights would not be enforced. 3s Although the court ultimately
gave sole custody of the child to the Sterns under the "best
interests of the offspring" argument,39 it refused to terminate
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

537 A.2d. 1227 (N.J. 1988).
[d. at 1234.
[d. at 1236.
[d. at 1240.
[d. at 1243.
The court based this conclusion on the instability of the Whitehead family and
the financial difficulties they had incurred. For instance, Mrs. Whitehead's sister was
in the process of foreclosing on her second mortgage; Mr. Whitehead's employment was
always at risk because of his alcoholism; and Mrs. Whitehead had not worked for some
time. [d. at 1258.
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Throughout its opinion the court focused on the fact that
Mrs. Whitehead was the "natural mother," and stated that
the father's paternal right was no greater than the mother's.40
By stating that Mrs. Whitehead was the child's "natural
mother," the court seemed to give great weight to the fact
that Mrs. Whitehead was both the biological mother and the
gestational mother, who had undergone an emotional bond
with the offspring prior to its birth. Despite acknowledging
Mrs. Whitehead as the "natural mother," the court held that the
interest of the natural father and adoptive mother is the predominant interest to be taken into consideration. 41
B.

California Surrogacy Cases

In a recent California case dealing with "pure surrogacy,"
the California Court of Appeals came down with the same
result as the Baby M. case, but under different reasoning.
On July 31, 1991 the California Court of Appeals decided the
Adoption of Matthew B.,42 and denied the surrogate's petition
to withdraw her consent to give up parental rights based on the
legality of the contract. The court stated that the parties had
assumed the risk of illegality when entering into the contract43 and that the best interests of the child favored leaving
him with his natural father and adoptive mother.44
Using these "pure surrogacy" cases as persuasive authority in deciding our IVF hypothetical, a California court would
probably grant custody ofthe child to the recipient couple for
the following reasons. First, the donor/genetic mother, citing
to Baby M.,46 would argue that contracting away one's parental
rights is invalid, and therefore, as the "natural mother" she
should retain custody of the child. Yet the term "natural
mother" as used in Baby M., is misleading in the context of IVF
through egg donation. In IVF, the donor/genetic mother is only
40. [d. at 1247.
41. [d. at 1248.

42. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239.
43. [d. at 1256.
44. The court stated, "[olur conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's
direction that courts should not construe adoption consent requirements in favor of
the rights of the natural parent, but should liberally construe them so as to further
the main purpose of the adoption statutes: promoting .. .'the welfare of children,
bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recognition
and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child.'" [d. at 1257.
45. 537 A.2d at 1227.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/7

8

Treppa: In Vitro Fertilization

1992]

IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

785

the biological donor; she does not carry the offspring nor does
she give birth to it. It is the recipient/gestational mother who
undergoes the nine-months of pregnancy and feels the emotional "bond" with the child which the surrogate experienced
in Baby M. The recipient/gestational mother has an equal, and
perhaps greater argument that she is the "natural mother" of
the offspring, even if she is not biologically related.
Second, a California court may use the reasoning of
Matthew B.,46 and simply uphold the contract. Assuming the
donor/genetic mother gives informed consent to use her donated eggs in the recipient's IVF treatment, and she is fully compensated according to the terms of the contract, the court
would find full performance of the contract. In doing so, the
court would uphold the contract in favor of the recipient couple, even if the contract is deemed illegalY
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court may look
to the "best interests of the offspring" to grant custody to the
recipient couple. Although the donor may argue that Baby M.
dealt with an unstable family in the Whitehead's,48 this is probably not enough to overcome the language in Matthew B.49
The court stated that the adoption statutes should be construed liberally by recognizing that the closest counterpart to
the relationship of parent and child weighs heavily in favor of
the recipient couple. The recipient couple has psychologically and economically planned for the birth and care of the child
from the beginning. They have undergone the nine months of
pregnancy together, with the recipient female actually giving
birth to the child. These factors would favor their claim over
the claim of the donor/genetic mother as the closest counterpart to the relationship of parent and child.
However, this is only one consideration by the court. It is
important to keep in mind that IVF through egg donation
46. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239.
47. The court in Matthew B., quoting Denning v. Taber, states that, "courts
will not intercede where the parties have fully performed under the illegal contract.
This rule 'is intended to preserve the dignity of the law by refusing to determine controversies dependent upon the construction of illegal contracts.'" Id. at 1256.
48. See supra note 39.
49. California Civil Code Section 226(a) sets forth a number offactors for the court
to consider in determining the child's best interests. It directs that consideration of the
best interests shall include: an assessment of the child's age, the extent of bonding with
the prospective adoptive parent or parents, the extent of bonding or the potential to bond
with the natural parent or parents, and the ability of the natural parent or parents to
provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the child. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1263.
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involves three people, while surrogacy involves only two.
Consequently, the outcome of the "pure surrogacy" cases is persuasive but not controlling. Thus, a court faced with an IVF
egg donation custody battle would have to look beyond surrogacy case law and focus on decisions involving other reproductive techniques for further guidance.
IV.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION CASES

In 1986, the California Court of Appeals decided Jhordan
C. v. Mary K.50 This case involved a child conceived by artificial insemination with semen donated personally to Mary
from Jhordan. 51 The court held that where the parties have
failed to take advantage of the statutory basis for preclusion
of paternity, 52 the donor of semen can be determined to be the
father of the child in a paternity action. 53 The court awarded
sole legal and physical custody to the mother, but granted the
male donor substantial visitation rights.
In its conclusion, the court stressed that public policy in the
area of non-traditional notions of family structure is best
determined by the legislative branch. 54 Yet the court seems to
be affecting public policy by ignoring the "best interests of
the offspring" argument55 that protects the social and financial
well-being of the child produced. The court's failure to address
this issue may lie in the fact that Mary was to raise the child
jointly with her same-sex partner Victoria. By ignoring the
"best interests of the offspring" argument, the court avoids a
discussibn of non-traditional family structures for the sole
purpose of keeping a male figure in the child's life. As a
result, the court's reasoning should be used very cautiously and
50. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986).
51. Id. at 389.
52. This statutory preclusion is found in California Civil Code Section 7005, that
provides in pertinent part, "[i]f, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with
the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by
another man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as ifhe were the natural father of a child thereby conceived .... The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as ifhe were not the natural father ofthe child thereby conceived." CAL.
CIY. CODE 7005 (West 1988).
53. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 389.
54. The court states that this decision does not express any, "judicial preference
toward traditional notions of family structure or toward providing a father where a
single woman has chosen to bear a child." Id. at 397.
55. There was nothing in the record of this case showing that Mary was unfit to
raise the child herself, as the agreement between Jhordan and herself called for.
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may not be a good basis for determining the outcome of the IVF
hypothetical.
Nonetheless, both the recipient couple and the donor in our
hypothetical IVF lawsuit can use Jhordan to further their
positions. The egg donor can point toward the court's unwillingness to uphold the contract, and place the child with its biological mother. The donor may even be able to borrow from the
language of California Civil Code Section 7005 66 in an attempt
to exclude the recipient husband as a sperm donor.
On the other hand, the recipient couple has two compelling
arguments to support its position. First, the couple can argue
that the court's unwillingness to uphold the contract was
based on the need to keep a male figure present in the child's
life. In so doing, the recipient couple focuses the court on the
best interests of the child. Second, the couple can also point
to California Civil Code Section 7005 and argue that, although
its language expressly deals with artificial insemination rights,
it should analogously apply to egg donation cases in order to
keep up with new reproductive techniques. They can point out
that section 7005 was designed to take away the legal parental
rights of the donor,67 and that this should apply equally to
female donors as well as male donors. Using the artificial
insemination cases cautiously in deciding our IVF hypothetical, a California court would probably find for the recipient
couple because of the similarity between an egg donor and a
sperm donor. Because of this similarity, the argument to terminate the donor's parental rights under section 7005 seems
to be the strongest argument.
V.

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CASES

Gestational surrogacy differs from "pure surrogacy" in
that the surrogate is not the biological mother of the child. A
woman who cannot carry a child to term will contract with a
surrogate for gestational services. This differs from IVF egg
donation in that the gestational surrogate is the one who has
the fertilized embryo implanted into her uterine cavity and she
carries the child through the gestational process.
The California Court of Appeals recently decided Anna J.
v. Mark C.,68 a case that could affect the continuation of
56. See supra note 52.
57. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12436.
58. [d. at 12433.
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noncoital reproductive agreements. Mark and his wife Crispina
contracted to have a biological child delivered to them by
Anna, who would receive $10,000 for carrying the child to
term. &9 When the child was born, Anna, like Mary Beth
Whitehead in Baby M., decided that she could not give the child
to Mark and Crispina. &0 The trial court found in favor of Mark
and Crispina, ruling that they were the "genetic, biological and
natural" father and mother. It also ruled that the contract was
legal and enforceable against Anna's claims. 61
Because the trial court found the contract valid, it would
appear that the Court of Appeals would uphold this decision on
a contractual basis. But the court went one step further, holding that, "[I]f a blood test shows a woman is not the natural
mother of the child, the case must be decided accordingly;"62
granting no parental rights to the surrogate. The court felt that
the genetic ties between the donor and the offspring were the
deciding factor. In so doing, the court did not accept the gestational mother's claim of maternity under California Civil
Code Section 7003. 63 The court found the statute silent on
whether a birth mother is automatically the "natural mother,"
particularly when her maternity is ruled out by blood tests. 64
While holding that genetics controls, the court's analysis
tracks the reasoning of the artificial insemination cases.
The court stated that sperm donors, even though genetically
tied to the child, would have no rights to custody.66 If the
court wanted to protect the interests of Mark and Crispina so
as not to, "deprive them of the traditional parental relationship
which they might otherwise enjoy,"66 it could have simply
upheld the trial court's ruling on a contractual basis.
59.
60.
61.
62.

[d. at 12434.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 12433.

63. California Civil Code Section 7003 provides in pertinent part, "[tlhe parent
and child relationship may be established as follows: (1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child." [d.
at 12435.
64. [d. at 12436.
65. The court, addressing California Civil Code Section 7005 states, "[slection 7005
seeks not to punish sperm donors, but to protect both sperm donors and married couples who employ artificial insemination. If being a sperm donor carried with it the
responsibilities of parenthood, the pool of volunteers would be small indeed. And by
the same token, if employing artificial insemination brought with it potential claims
from sperm donors, few couples would use the procedure." [d.
66. [d. at 12437.
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How would this same court decide our hypothetical case
involving an egg donor and the recipient couple? If Anna J. is
read literally, the egg donor/genetic mother of the offspring,
would at the very least obtain partial custody.
The recipient couple can argue in support of the court's
position that genetics should only control in gestational surrogacy cases. First, the holding should not apply to IVF
through egg donation for the same reasons the court concluded it should not apply to cases of sperm donation. 87 If the
court supports promoting and protecting the rights of couples
using forms of reproduction involving sperm donors, the same
protection should apply to the rights of couples contracting with
egg donors. Second, the contract in Anna J. was upheld, thus
the court must enforce the contract in an egg donation scenario
as well in order to give the parties what they freely bargained
for. Third, public policy should favor the recipient couple in
order to protect the best interests of the child.
Based on the holding in Anna J. that genetics controls
parental rights, a California court deciding the hypothetical
IVF egg donation case would probably have to grant joint custody to the donor and the husband whose semen was used in
creating the child. This decision however, would ignore considerations of the contract and the best interests of the child.
VI.

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE OFFSPRING

When parenthood is separated along genetic, gestational,
and social lines, the arguments seem to address the adults
involved and what rights they have. This focus ignores what
should be the strongest interest served, namely, the protection
of the child. At the heart of the "best interests of the offspring" argument is stability and continuity for the child. 88 The
fear seems to be that children will be confused by the delination of genetic, gestational and rearing parents. With IVF egg
donation, the child will have agenetic link with the rearing
father and a biological link with the donor/genetic mother.
But it is the recipient/gestational mother who has the strongest
link. The recipient female, while pregnant, shares most of her
major bodily functions with the child. For some time after
birth, the child retains and uses the woman's life-preserving
67. See supra note 65.
68. In Re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d. 725, 730-31 (1979).
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tissue, cells, blood, nutrients, and anti-bodies. 69 Only the lack
of a genetic tie between the gestational, rearing mother and the
offspring distinguishes noncoital reproduction with donor eggs
from children who are coitally conceived. 70
Where then, is the child better situated to live? Is it with
it's biological mother? Or is it with it's genetic father and
gestational mother? The answer is difficult because custody
of a child born by way of IVF egg donation has yet to be litigated. In looking at the surrogacy and gestational surrogacy
cases for guidance, it seems clear that the "best interests of the
offspring" argument is simply a judicial tool without clear
parameters, which finds a way to give custody to the married
couple. Whether or not this enhances stability for the child is
arguable, but granting sole custody to the recipient couple
would protect reproductive choice and keep these children out
of ugly court battles-a factor that should be given great consideration.
In determining the "best interests of the offspring," a court
must make an, "assessment of the emotional bonds between
parent and child, upon an inquiry into the heart of the parentchild relationship the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent gives to the child throughout his formative
years, and often beyond. "71 In our IVF egg donation hypothetical, the donor can only argue that she is the genetic mother and is bonded with the child biologically. Conversely, the
recipient couple can point to many factors to establish their
emotional bond with the offspring. First, and most importantly
is that the recipient/gestational mother has carried the child
to term and has bonded emotionally and physically with the
child for that nine-month period. Second, the male is the
genetic father, and together with the gestational mother the
recipient couple may begin to raise the child, while the donor
may not have even seen the child prior to the lawsuit. If a
meaningful and healthy attachment had formed, then disrupting this bond may cause the child to, "become fragmented, depressed, and insecure in his attachments .... »72 If stability,
69. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12436.
70. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Human Egg Donation, 52 Fert. and
Steril. 353, 355 (Sept. 1989).
71. In Matthew B., the court found both parties capable of providing for Matthew's
health, safety, and welfare, and no difference in terms of the opportunities for education. The court then stated that they must inquire into the parties' bonding to
Matthew and their fitness as parents. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1264.
72. ld. at 1265.
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continuity, and a loving relationship are the most important criteria for determining the "best interests of the child,"73 the court
would grant custody to the recipient couple in order to protect
these interests.
V. WHAT TOMORROW MAY LOOK LIKE FOR THE EGG
DONATION RECIPIENT COUPLE
A couple employing IVF by way of egg donation in order to
conceive a child they could not otherwise conceive, may face a
situation they never dreamed of: the egg donor comes back into
their lives after the birth of the child and sues for custody. As
stated earlier, there has yet to be a case litigated involving IVF
egg donation, therefore, the recipient couple must look to
other areas of the law to support their claim and retain custody of the child.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

One place for the recipient couple to start is by showing
they have a constitutionally protected right of access to the
reproductive technique of IVF by egg donation, and therefore,
interference with this access would be a constitutional violation. Although nowhere in the United States Constitution
are individuals expressly granted the right ofprivacy,74 there
are implied protections regarding the right to procreate,76 the
right to privacy within marriage, and the right of access to contraceptives.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 76 The majority noted, "We
are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamen. tal to the very existence and survival of the race."77 In the
years since Skinner, the Court has expanded its assertion of the
constitutional status of the right to procreate, finding it
73. [d. at 1264; [quoting Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 542 (1986)].
74. 410 U.S. at 152.
75. Otherwise known as the right to bear or beget children.
76. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner the Court held unconstitutional a statute
that permitted the sterilization of criminals who were three times convicted of certain
crimes. Id. at 538.
77. [d. at 541.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7

792

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:777

protected by both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 78
The right to privacy within marriage was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. 79 In Griswold, the
Court struck down a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives because it violated the right of marital privacy.8o
This right to privacy was then expanded to include unmarried
persons. 8l
Following this line of cases, an infertile couple can assert
that to prohibit their access to IVF through egg donation by taking away the resulting child is to interfere with the right to privacy within marriage. If the recipient couple has an infertility
problem, the decision to resort to IVF is essentially a decision
to "bear or beget a child. "82 Prohibiting the use of IVF effectively denies an infertile couple the right to procreate. It is not
a question of "how," but "whether" to bear a child if such
means is the only way to conceive a child.
B.

CASE LAW CONSIDERATIONS

The second line of argument for the recipient couple is
based on the cases involving surrogacy, artificial insemination,
and gestational surrogacy. Although the facts and decisions
analyzed in Sections 111-V of this article are distinguishable
from each other, one thing remains clear: the courts' willingness to grant custody of the child to the recipient couple. This
78. One example is Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
The Supreme Court voided a school district rule that required pregnant teachers to
take maternity leave during the last five months of pregnancy, holding that such a rule,
"can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." [d. at 639.
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. The Court, in rendering its decision, reasoned, "[t]he present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees. And concerns law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives
rather than regulating their manufacture and sale, seeks to achieve its goals by
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship ....The very idea
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." [d. at
485-86.
81. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court concluded that, "[i]fthe
right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." [d. at 453.
82. [d.
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is shown in the cases of Matter of Baby M.,83 Adoption of
Matthew B.,SJo Anna J. v. Mark C.,8li and Jhordan C. v. Mary K88
It seems the courts hold tantamount protecting the best
interests of the child. These interests are best served by the
recipient couple; who has planned for the raising of the child
from the beginning; who has undergone the nine months of
pregnancy together; and who has "bonded" with the child.
The courts find these considerations should not be overridden
by the fact that the donor has a genetic tie with the child.
Further, the California courts are seemingly willing to uphold
these arrangements as a valid contract. 87
C.

LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

In the context of IVF egg donation, California Civil Code
Section 7003 88 should be read in conjunction with Section
7005 89 in order to establish the parent and child relationship
with respect to the natural mother. The fact that Section
7005 expressly relinquishes the parental rights of a sperm
donor should be a major factor in the court's determination of
whether or not to relinquish the parental rights of an egg
donor. If a sperm donor has no legal right or obligation to an
offspring produced by his donated sperm, there is no logical reason that the same should not hold true for an egg donor. It
seems absurd that there would be legislation protecting a couple using artificial insemination against a claim by the donor
while not having any such legislation protecting a couple
using IVF egg donation from a claim by an egg donor. The
California legislature may avoid custody battles in this area by
following the lead of other states. 90 But until then, a court
should read California Civil Code Sections 7003 and 7005
83. 537 A.2d at 1227.
84. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239.
85. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12433.
86. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386.
87. See Matthew B. and Anna J. supra notes 11, 13.
88. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12435.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE SECTION 7005 (West 1988). See supra note 52.
90. One state that has passed legislation dealing explicitly with egg/oocyte
donation is Oklahoma. Oklahoma Statute Section 554 states, "[a]ny child or children
born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall be considered for all intent and
purposes, the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and
wife which consent to and receive an oocyte pursuant to the use of the technique ofheterologous oocyte donation." Oklahoma Statute Section 555 states, "[a] n oocyte donor
shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of a
heterologous oocyte donation from such donor." 10 Okl. St. 554, 555 (1990).
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together, in order to see the compelling interests of the recipient couple that must be served.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While there is no modern treatment for infertility, a couple
wanting to have a child has many choices. One of those
choices, IVF through egg donation, allows the husband to be
genetically related to the child, and the wife to experience
gestation and the birth of the resulting child. Is the potential
disappointment experienced by the donor a sufficient basis for
courts to override allocation of rearing rights and duties in the
offspring? To do so would shift the emphasis to the welfare of
the donor, away from the welfare of the offspring or the recipient couple. At the present and in the absence of legislative
guidance, the court fortunately seems unwilling to make that
shift.
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